Homomorphic Encryption and Bootstrapping

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- Homomorphic Encryption
- Learning With Errors (LWE) encryption/decryption
- RLWE encryption
- Bootstrap

• 1900-1950: **Symmetric** Encryption (same key) (Enigma, Shannon Information theory, ...)





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- 1970s: **Asymmetric** Encryption (encryption with *public key*, decryption with *private* key)
- Only thing people did with crypted data ... was decrypt it...
- Today (big data era), we want to perform (cloud) computing on encrypted data, *e.g.* for machine learning applications
- Need to be able to perform **sums** and **products** on encrypted data

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• Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) preserves both addition and multiplication.

• For $n, q, t \in \mathbb{N}^*$ with t|q and a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_t \subset \mathbb{Z}_q$, the **LWE** encryption with the key $\vec{s} \leftarrow \chi_{key}(\mathbb{Z}_q^n)$ of m is defined as:

$$LWE_{q,\vec{s}}(m) := (\vec{a}, b) = (\vec{a}, \langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle + \tilde{m} + e) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1},$$

where $\vec{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, error $e \leftarrow \chi_{error}(\mathbb{Z}_q)$ and $\tilde{m} = \frac{q}{t}m$.

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where $\vec{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, error $e \leftarrow \chi_{error}(\mathbb{Z}_q)$ and $\tilde{m} = \frac{q}{t}m$.

• The decryption of a ciphertext (\vec{a}, b) of m is

$$\textit{LWE}^{-1}(ec{a},b) := \lceil rac{t}{q}(b - \langle ec{a},ec{s}
angle)
floor \in \mathbb{Z}_q.$$

• Let $Err_{LWE}((\vec{a}, b), m) = \frac{t}{q}(b - \langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle) - m = \frac{t}{q}e$. If $|\frac{t}{q}e| \in [0, 1/2]$ then $LWE^{-1}(\vec{a}, b) = m \rightarrow \text{Successful decryption}$.

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On the other hand we have,

$$\begin{aligned} LWE_{q,\vec{s}}(m_1) + LWE_{q,\vec{s}}(m_2) \\ &= (\vec{a}_1, b_1) + (\vec{a}_2, b_2) = (\vec{a}_1 + \vec{a}_2, b_1 + b_2) \\ &= (\vec{a}_1 + \vec{a}_2, \langle \vec{a}_1 + \vec{a}_2, s \rangle + (\tilde{m}_1 + \tilde{m}_2) + \underbrace{(e_1 + e_2)}_{\text{sum noise}}) \\ &= LWE_{q,\vec{s}}(m_1 + m_2). \end{aligned}$$

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•LWE encryption is **homomorphic** at the cost of accumulated noise which can be reduced with **bootstrapping**.

• For $N, Q, t \in \mathbb{N}^*$ with t|q and a message $m(X) \in \mathcal{R}_Q = \mathcal{R}/Q\mathcal{R}$ with $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^N + 1)$, the **RLWE encryption** with the key $z(X) \leftarrow \chi_{key}(\mathcal{R}_Q)$ of $m \in \mathcal{R}_t$ is defined as:

$$\textit{RLWE}_{\mathcal{Q},m{z}}(m{m}) := (m{a},m{b}) = (m{a},m{a}\cdotm{z}+m{ ilde{m}}+m{e}) \in \mathcal{R}^2_\mathcal{Q},$$

where $\boldsymbol{a} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\boldsymbol{Q}}$, error $\boldsymbol{e} \leftarrow \chi_{error}(\mathcal{R}_{\boldsymbol{Q}})$ and $\tilde{\boldsymbol{m}} = \frac{Q}{t}\boldsymbol{m}$. RLWE encryption is linearly homomorphic.

To **multiply** by arbitrary ring elements, we introduce the encryption scheme

 $RLWE'_{z}(\boldsymbol{m}) = RLWE_{z}(\boldsymbol{m}, RLWE_{z}(B\boldsymbol{m}), \dots, RLWE_{z}(B^{k-1}\boldsymbol{m})).$

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Lemma

For two messages $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{R}_Q$ with m_1 small, we have:

 $RLWE_{z}(m_{0}) \diamond RGSW_{z}(m_{1}) = RLWE_{z}(m_{0} \cdot m_{1})$

• Implement functions RLWE, RLWE⁻¹, RGSW, \diamond

• Need to work on $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N + 1)$, implement product and tensor product of matrices of polynomials (links with FFT).

• Test code/decode functions on $N_{exp} = 100$ independent runs and test the evolution of the succes rate recovery with different parameters $N \in \{2^9; 2^{10}\}$ and $q \in \{2^4; 2^5; 2^6; 2^7; 2^8\}$ and $\sigma \in [0; 10]$, to see the effect of noise

Experiments code/decode RLWE, $N \in \{2^9, 2^{10}\}$, and $\sigma = 0.5:5$



Experiments Sum RLWE, $N \in \{2^9, 2^{10}\}$ and $\sigma = 0.5: 10$





Experiments Prod RLWE, $N \in \{2^9, 2^{10}\}$ and $\sigma = 0.01: 0.3$



0.15

Sigma

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.00

0.05

0.10

Hint of Bootstrap: Trick of working in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N+1)$

For a polynomial $w(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} w_i X^i$ and any $u \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, we have

 $coeff_0(X^{-u}w(X)) = coeff_u(w(X)) = w_u$

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Recall that $b-\langle ec{a},ec{s}
angle= ilde{m}+e$ so that with $u=b-\langle ec{a},ec{s}
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as soon as w(X) is well-chosen with coefficients equal on subsets. **GOAL**: write this formula with ciphertext \rightarrow bootstrap scheme • Of course you cannot reveal the secret key *s*... but you can publicly reveal an encryption $Enc_{s'}(s)$ of it !

• Bootstrap = Use $Encryption(key_s) + tricks$ with polynomials

This is the bootstrap for noise reduction in LWE encryption.

Figure: Bootstrapping steps

 $(\vec{a}, b) = LWE_s(m) \rightarrow$

 $(\vec{a}, b) = LWE_s(m) \rightarrow (a_z(X), b_z(X)) = RLWE_{z(X)}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} \cdot w(X))$

• Step 2: Key switching

 $(a_z(X),b_z(X)) \to$

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$$(a_s(X), b_s(X)) \rightarrow (\vec{a}, b) = LWE_s(m)$$

OUTPUT: Cipher $LWE_s(m) = (\vec{a}, b)$ with error e' < e

$$(\vec{a}, b) = LWE_s(m) \rightarrow (a_z(X), b_z(X)) = RLWE_{z(X)}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} \cdot w(X))$$

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• $u = -b + \langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle$.

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• Since $\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle = \sum_{i} a_{i}s_{i}, X^{\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} = \prod_{i} X^{a_{i}s_{i}}$,
 $RLWE_{z}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} w) = RLWE_{z}(X^{-b}w)$

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 $RLWE_{z}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} w) = RLWE_{z}(X^{-b}w) \diamond RGSW_{z}(X^{a_{0}s_{0}}) \cdots \diamond RGSW_{z}(X^{a_{n-1}s_{n-1}})$

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- $u = -b + \langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle.$ • Since $\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle = \sum_{i} a_{i}s_{i}, X^{\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} = \prod_{i} X^{a_{i}s_{i}},$ $RLWE_{z}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} w) = RLWE_{z}(X^{-b}w) \diamond RGSW_{z}(X^{a_{0}s_{0}}) \cdots \diamond RGSW_{z}(X^{a_{n-1}s_{n-1}})$
 - The Bootstrap Keys are publicly available

$$BK_{i,j} = RGSW_{z}(X^{js_i}), \quad 0 \le i \le n, \quad 0 \le j < q$$

Step 1: Blind rotation with further decompostion

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$$X^{\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} = \prod_i X^{a_i s_i} = \prod_{i,j} X^{a_{i,j} B^j s_i}$$
 with $a_i = \sum_j a_{i,j} B^j$

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 $BK_{i,j,l} = RGSW_{\mathbf{z}}(X^{IB^{j}s_{i}}), \quad 0 \leq i \leq n, \ 0 \leq j < \log_{B}(q), \ 0 \leq l < B.$

 $(\vec{a}, b) = LWE_s(m) \rightarrow (a_z(X), b_z(X)) = RLWE_{z(X)}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} \cdot w(X))$

• Step 2: Key switching

 $(a_z(X), b_z(X)) \rightarrow (a_s(X), b_s(X)) = RLWE_{s(X)}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} \cdot w(X))$

• Step 3: Extraction

$$(a_s(X), b_s(X)) \rightarrow (\vec{a}, b) = LWE_s(m)$$

OUTPUT: Cipher $LWE_s(m) = (\vec{a}, b)$ with error e' < e

Key switching operation converts a ciphertext $RLWE_{z_1}(\mathbf{m})$ of a message $\mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{R}_Q$ encrypted by a secret key $\mathbf{z}_1 \in R_Q$ to a ciphertext $RLWE_{\mathbf{z}_2}(\mathbf{m})$ encrypted by a new secret key $\mathbf{z}_2 \in \mathcal{R}_Q$.

Algorithm 1: Key Switching in RLWE

Inputs :
$$(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) = RLWE_{\mathbf{z}_1}(\mathbf{m}), \mathbf{z}_2$$

Outputs: $(\mathbf{a}', \mathbf{b}') = RLWE_{\mathbf{z}_2}(\mathbf{m})$
1 Compute $RLWE_{\mathbf{z}_2}(B^j \cdot \mathbf{z}_1) =: (KS_j^{\mathbf{a}}, KS_j^{\mathbf{b}})$ for
 $j = 0, \dots, K := \log_B Q - 1$
2 Write $\mathbf{a} = \sum_{j=0}^{K} \alpha_j B^j$ where $\alpha_j = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} a_{i,j} X^i$ such that
 $|a_{i,j}| \leq B - 1$
3 Return $(\mathbf{a}', \mathbf{b}') = (-\sum_{j=1}^{K} \alpha_j \cdot KS_j^{\mathbf{a}}, \mathbf{b} - \sum_{j=1}^{K} \alpha_j \cdot KS_j^{\mathbf{b}})$

 $(\vec{a}, b) = LWE_s(m) \rightarrow (a_z(X), b_z(X)) = RLWE_{z(X)}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} \cdot w(X))$

• Step 2: Key switching

 $(a_z(X), b_z(X)) \to (a_s(X), b_s(X)) = RLWE_{s(X)}(X^{-b+\langle \vec{a}, \vec{s} \rangle} \cdot w(X))$

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 $(a_s(X), b_s(X)) \rightarrow (\vec{a}, b) = LWE_s(m)$

OUTPUT: Cipher $LWE_s(m) = (\vec{a}, b)$ with error e' < e

Let $RLWE_{\boldsymbol{s}(X)}(\boldsymbol{m}(X)) = (\boldsymbol{a}(X), \boldsymbol{b}(X)) \in \mathcal{R}_Q$. We have $\boldsymbol{b}(X) = \boldsymbol{a}(X) \cdot \boldsymbol{s}(X) + \tilde{\boldsymbol{m}}(X) + \boldsymbol{e}(X)$

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. We have
 $\boldsymbol{b}(X) = \boldsymbol{a}(X) \cdot \boldsymbol{s}(X) + \tilde{\boldsymbol{m}}(X) + \boldsymbol{e}(X)$

At the i^{th} coefficient we have:

$$egin{aligned} b_i &= \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} a_{i-k} s_k + ilde{m}_i + e_i \ &= \langle \iota_i(oldsymbol{a}), s
angle + ilde{m}_i + e_i \end{aligned}$$

where $\iota_i(\mathbf{a})$ is the *i*th anti-cyclic permutation of coefficients of \mathbf{a} .

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where $\iota_i(\mathbf{a})$ is the *i*th anti-cyclic permutation of coefficients of \mathbf{a} . Since $\mathbf{e}(X)$ is small, so is e_i , thus $(\iota_i(\mathbf{a}), b_i)$ is a *LWE*_s encryption of m.

Conclusion and Bootstrap Today



Figure: Craig Gentry (father of Bootstrap !)

• 2009: Craig Gentry Phd dissertation on Bootstrap for FHE

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- 2009: Craig Gentry Phd dissertation on Bootstrap for FHE
- 2014: Léo Ducas and Daniele Micciancio "Bootstrapping Homomorphic Encryption in less than a second"

• 2017: Chilloti et al. obtained speed up from less than 1 s to less than 0.1 s + reduce the 1 GB bootstrapping key size to 24 MB, preserving the same security levels.

• New perspectives: parallel and distributed computing, bootstrap on GPU's (2021), faster and faster ... FHE is active field of research!